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Introduction
The abortion rights debate is one of the more sensitive and divisive issues
in American politics. It would be a mistake to even characterize it as a singular de-
bate. Rather, our abortion rights discourse cuts across several value-laden issues on
which Americans harbor strong convictions.' For example, the abortion debate im-
plicates the status of human life, the role of women in society, the proper role of the
judiciary, and the status and meaning of fundamental rights. This Essay explores a
specific dimension of that debate: the intersection between the legal and moral rea-
soning used both to justify and to limit abortions, and the legal and moral reason-
ing courts have used when confronting decisions concerning medical choices that
parents and doctors must make about certain conjoined twins. This juxtaposition
reveals both how the treatment of one bioethical situation can have a direct impact
on how courts continue to review the permissibility of abortion, and how courts
might use new facts and understandings to approve further limitations on the
availability of abortions. Each such case can define how society understands the
contours of the abortion debate.
In the relatively new field of the law of bioethics, courts and lawmakers are
often confronted with novel issues concerning the status and definition of human
life. Examples of this are the status of embryos used for in vitro fertilization 2 and
the status of embryos used in stem cell research.3 These two frameworks produce
very different understandings of the embryo and human life. The former empha-
sizes the embryo as part of a path to a new human being, while the latter empha-
sizes the embryo as cells with invaluable therapeutic purposes.
This Essay selects a particular case in bioethics, In re A,4 an English case
permitting a hospital to separate conjoined twin girls, Mary and Jodie, over the ob-
jection of the parents, to illustrate how the language and concepts employed in a
case facially unrelated to the issue of abortion can impact the abortion debate. My
central thesis is that lawyers and judges writing in the field of bioethics must be
vigilant not only about outcomes, but also about legal and philosophical reasoning
in related bioethical debates. An effort to reach a "correct" decision in one bio-
ethical situation might ultimately constrain future cases and issues in unintended
ways.
1 See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells, and Cloning, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
101 (2003) (providing a general treatment of the many ethical and social dimensions of abortion).
2 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051,1057 (Mass. 2000).
3 See generally Monitoring Stem Cell Research, available at
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/stemcell/pcbe-final-version-monitoring-stem-cell-research.pdf;
Marta Brodsky, Note, The Viability of Our Humanity: Will the Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence Sur-
vive the Challenge of Embryonic Stem Cell Research?, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 (2002).
4 In re A, [2001] Fain. 147 (U.K.).
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Part I begins by examining how bioethical reasoning can impact abortion
discourse, often in more subtle ways than one would first imagine. I then detail the
troubling facts of In re A and the English court's uneasy legal resolution. I propose
that such a decision, if rendered in the United States, could alter the contours of
abortion jurisprudence because the court unequivocally assumes that Mary, the
non-viable twin, is a person without considering the logic or ramifications of this
contention.
Part II presents the theoretical argument that Mary and a fetus are practi-
cally indistinguishable. It argues that the ways in which we understand a fetus as
distinct from an infant apply exactly to Mary. This Part also introduces the concept
of a "gatekeeper theory of personhood": that is, a strategy of identifying qualities
that are not features of personhood and situating the fetus squarely in those catego-
ries. Part III applies this comparison to the current law regarding abortion in the
United States. The line drawn in Roe v. Wade permitting states to prohibit abortions
only after the fetus has become viable has been heavily criticized as arbitrary.
However, I suggest that the reasoning used in Part II to conclude that Mary is not a
person provides a solid defense for maintaining the current constitutional standard
for the permissibility of abortions. The Conclusion then suggests how a court ought
to resolve a case with similar facts to In re A that is most consistent with current
abortion doctrine in the United States.
I. The Significance of Bioethical Reasoning to Abortion Debates
Persons disfavoring prohibitions on abortion frame the abortion debate
around the issue of the rights of persons to make important decisions regarding
their health and bodily autonomy. Despite this desire to focus the discourse on the
woman, her body, and her choices, pro-choice activists do not have the luxury of
ignoring developments in science and the law that impact the abortion debate. For
example, pro-choice activists often fear that laws that criminalize harm to a fetus
will either limit abortion rights or undercut the reasoning used to support pro-
choice policies. 5 This represents an instance where both the outcome and the rea-
soning behind a legal development are damaging to abortion rights. This Essay
highlights instances when the reasoning itself behind a legal development could
influence the contours of abortion jurisprudence. Part I.A examines how cases in-
volving the disposition of certain conjoined twin neonates can have consequences
for abortion rights analysis. Part I.B then details the facts of In re A, which could
have a significant impact on abortion jurisprudence.
5 See, e.g., Unborn-Victims Bill Passes House, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2004, at A2 (detailing Congress' passage
of a bill making attacks against pregnant women into two separate crimes -an attack against the woman
and an attack against the fetus- which pro-choice activists immediately complained "would undermine
abortion rights by giving fetuses new federal legal status").
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A. Consequences for Abortion Jurisprudence
The abortion debate encompasses many issues and arguments, but the no-
tion of personhood is particularly important. The argument, in its simplest form,
posits that states ought to protect persons from public and private harms, and
should extend these given protections to all persons. Thus, a fetus or embryo has
the same entitlements to be free from mortal harm as post-natal persons do if a fe-
tus or embryo is indeed a person. It is not surprising, then, that many of the argu-
ments made in the abortion debate center around the question of whether an em-
bryo or fetus is a person. The arguments can be scientific, religious, moral, or phi-
losophical in nature, but all seek to answer the problem of which living beings are
rights-bearing agents.
Given the sensitivity of such judgments, courts often attempt to side-step
the issue. Justice Blackmun, for example, proclaimed that the court would attempt
to avoid the religious or moral convictions about abortion and instead "resolve the
issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and predilection."6 The Eng-
lish court echoed this sentiment in In re A, announcing that "[t]his court is a court of
law, not of morals, and our task has been to find, and our duty is then to apply, the
relevant principles of law to the situation before us."7 However, a refusal to address
issues of personhood only obscures the legal arguments and creates the potential
for inconsistent legal doctrines. As Peter Singer has argued in defending abortion
rights, "[t]his may be good politics, but it is poor philosophy .... No-one who thinks
that a human fetus has the same right to life as other human beings could see the
abortion question as a matter of choice, any more than they would see slavery as a
matter of the free choice of slaveholders." 8
In Part III I argue that legal decisions like Roe v. Wade accept a certain no-
tion of personhood. These cases hold that the state may not prohibit abortions be-
fore the fetus becomes viable.9 In so doing, the Court has decided that the rights
and interests of one class of beings will never outweigh the rights and interests of
persons with competing claims. This division suggests a fundamental difference
between persons and non-viable fetuses. Though jurists may wish to stay clear of
the philosophical complexities of personhood, it is equally unsettling to imagine
that, under our Constitution as currently amended and understood, there are per-
sons with a lesser status than others.10
6 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
7 In re A, (2001) Fam. at 155.
8 PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR TRADITIONAL ETHICS 85 (1994).
9 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe, 410 U.S. at
163.
10 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[A]t the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution [African-Americans] were considered as a subordinate and inferior class of be-
ings .... The recent amendments of the constitution, it was supposed, had eradicated these principles
from our institutions.").
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It is of great importance, then, that lawyers with an interest in the law of
bioethics monitor competing conceptions of personhood in the law. In the follow-
ing section, I present the facts of In re A, which contains legal reasoning that sup-
ports a specific concept of personhood.
B. The Factual Background and Legal Disposition
In the fourth month of her pregnancy, an ultrasound examination revealed
that Mrs. A.M. was carrying conjoined twin girls. The examining physician con-
cluded that he would be unable to provide adequate medical care in Malta for this
highly unusual situation and arranged for Mrs. A.M. to travel to England for the
duration of the pregnancy. The twins were born with a condition known as "is-
chiopagus tetrapus," leaving the twins conjoined at the lower pelvis."
One twin, Jodie, appeared to be normal and healthy. She cried, was active,
and made spontaneous breathing efforts.' 2 The other twin, Mary, had severe prob-
lems. The trial court heard lengthy testimony from several experts concerning
Mary's condition. Mary had no chest or breath sounds and the doctors were unable
to intubate Mary. One doctor testified that after considerable effort, "'he could pass
the end of the clear tube into her main airway.' ' 13 Despite this "'he was not able to
detect any gasway at all, nor when he put a monitor into the ventilator to track for
excretion of carbon dioxide did he detect that any carbon dioxide, which should be
being exhaled, was coming out. So we never had any evidence that she has
breathed for herself at all.'" 14 Mary's head was enlarged due to swelling. The court
described Mary's brain as "poorly developed" and "primitive" while a neurologist
testified that "the degree of abnormality of Mary's brain" was "[viery severe in-
deed."15 Mary had "a virtual absence of functional lung tissue" 16 and was centrally
cyanosed, or "severely deoxygenated." 17 Finally, Mary's heart was "very dilated
and very poorly functioning. In terms of actually pumping blood out round the
body it is doing very little work of its own accord . . . if Jodie wasn't covering
Mary's circulation she wouldn't be alive now if they were separate twins."' 8 The
circulatory problems were a crucial fact for the court because "Jodie's aorta into
Mary's aorta and the arterial circulation runs from Jodie to Mary." 19 The lengthy
n In re A, (2001) Fam. at 158. The Court described this condition: "The ischium is the lower bone which
forms the lower and hinder part of the pelvis-the part which bears the weight of the body in sitting.
The lower ends of the spines are fused and the spinal cords joined. There is a continuation of the cover-
ings of the spinal cord between one twin and another. The bodies are fused from the umbilicus to the
sacrum." Id.
12 Id. at 157.
13 Id. at 158.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 161.
16 Id. at 162.
17 Id. at 157-58.
18 Id. at 161.
19 Id.
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opinion reiterates at several points that Mary was "not capable of separate sur-
vival."20
Any disputes between medical experts were generally over small details,
and the higher court reported succinctly that, "[hiad [Mary] been born a singleton,
she would not have been viable and would have died shortly after her birth. She is
alive only because a common artery enables her sister, who is stronger, to circulate
life sustaining oxygenated blood for both of them."21 The medical team further con-
cluded that, though Jodie had healthy and functioning organ systems, the support
she gave to her sister would eventually take a fatal toll, and that Jodie's heart
would fail under the stress of supporting both bodies.22 The physicians further con-
cluded that the twins successfully could be separated. Though Jodie might suffer
some disabilities, the doctors generally agreed that she would have normal life
prospects after the operation. Mary, on the other hand, would not survive the op-
eration, as she was incapable of survival on her own. The parents, devout Roman
Catholics, objected to the operation on religious grounds, claiming that, "'we can-
not begin to accept or contemplate that one of our children should die to enable the
other to survive. That is not God's will. Everyone has the right to life so why should
we kill one of our daughters to enable the other to survive."' 23 The hospital decided
to proceed with the operation, and the parents sought an injunction to stop the doc-
tors from performing the surgery.
In a very lengthy opinion, the British high court for family law refused to
enjoin the hospital from proceeding with the operation. The court based its decision
on two grounds. First, they found that both Jodie and Mary had a right to life and
that the operation was in the interest of Jodie but not in the interest of Mary. A
lengthy balancing analysis, however, led the court to conclude that the operation
was permissible, especially when understood as a positive act of invasive surgery
and not an act of withdrawal of treatment. Second, the court held that the doctors
would not be criminally liable because the purpose of the operation was to save the
life of Jodie, and there was no intent to kill Mary. A full analysis of the merits of the
court's opinion is beyond the scope of this Essay. However, I would note that the
court's opinion, while a valiant attempt at resolving extremely difficult issues of
law and morality, falls short of one's expectations for consistent, reasoned analysis.
One reason for this is that, given the court's recognition of Mary's personhood, it
was then required to engage in the balancing of rights and exploration of philoso-
phical problems such as the doctrine of double effect.24 If the court had focused on
20 Id.
21 Id. at 155.
22 Id. at 162-63. Doctors apparently disagreed about how long Jodie could support Mary, but even the
most generous estimate gave a life expectancy of three to six years.
23 Id. at 172.
24 The doctrine of double effect is a moral theory that distinguishes between intended and foreseen con-
sequences. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1139
(2003) ("[Tihe doctrine of double effect asserts that it may, sometimes, be more permissible to bring
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the fact that Mary did not qualify as a "person," the judges could have avoided
reaching these difficult issues.
The important feature of the court's decision for the purposes of this paper
is its recognition of Mary's status as a person. This conclusion is evident in the
court's holdings -both depend on the idea that Mary is a person whose rights and
claims must be respected and balanced -as well as in the express language of the
court. The court in fact found the proposition so self-evident that they hardly en-
gaged in any examination of personhood at all, instead noting that "it would be
contrary to common sense and to everyone's sensibilities to say that Mary is not
alive or that there are not two separate persons. It is, therefore, unnecessary to examine
the law in any depth at all." 25 This is a rather startling conclusion, and surprising in
light of the length of the opinion. Given the court's willingness to make extensive
inquiries into several areas of both criminal and family law, it is a bit disingenuous
to decline the opportunity to further analyze an area of law that would bear di-
rectly on the disposition of this case. The statement is probably best explained by a
sense of history on the part of the court-the judges were aware of past status of
"monsters" 26 assigned to conjoined twins, and likely wanted to do their best to
promote the dignity of the lives involved. This reflects the view held by some that
human life has an intrinsic sanctity independent of whether that being is a "per-
son."27 In contrast, I argue in Part II that by assigning Mary the status of person, the
court's opinion ultimately serves only to devalue human life, as Mary is now a per-
son, but a person with lesser rights and claims than that of a normal and healthy
human.
There is another manner in which In re A is instructive- it appears to hinge
on other rights concerns. In re A seems to be a case about parental rights, freedom
of religion, and end-of-life decisions. Indeed, all of the writings on this case to date
have addressed these problems, 28 and they have all unquestioningly assumed that
about harm as a foreseen or foreseeable but unintended side effect of one's otherwise permissible activ-
ity than to bring about equally weighty harmful consequences as an intended means or end of one's
activity.").
25 In re A, (2001) Fam. at 181 (emphasis added).
26 Id. at 149.
27 Ronald Dworkin has suggested that the belief that human life is intrinsically sacred or inviolable is
held by persons in both the pro-choice and pro-life movements. RONALD M. DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION
84 (1993). For a criticism of this view, see JEFF MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE
MARGINS OF LIFE 210-11 (2003).
28 See George J. Annas, The Limits of Law at the Limits of Life: Lessons from Cannibalism, Euthanasia, Abortion,
and the Court-Ordered Killing of One Conjoined Twin to Save the Other, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1275 (2001); Lisa
M. Hewitt, Note, A (Children): Conjoined Twins and Their Medical Treatment, 3 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 207
(2001); Shellie K. Park, Comment, Severing the Bond of Life: When Conflicts of Interest Fail to Recognize the
Value of Two Lives, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 157 (2002); Barry A. Bostrom, Nota Bene, In Re A (Children): In the
Royal Courts of Justice (England), 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 183 (2001); Jacqueline B. Tomasso, Note, Separation of
the Conjoined Twins: A Comparative Analysis of the Rights to Privacy and Religious Freedom in Great Britain
and the United States, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 771 (2002); Heather Tierney, Conjoined Twins: The Conflict Be-
tween Parents and the Courts Over the Medical Treatment of Children, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 458 (2002);
Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRiM. L. 481 (2002).
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Mary is a person, and therefore the resolution of the case necessarily involves bal-
ancing rights and interests in the way that one would with two or more persons. 29
Balancing these rights are issues that pro-choice activists can and should care
about. However, In re A might demonstrate that in a rush to reach the "correct"
decision on these or other bioethical issues, a court may deliver an opinion that is
directly contrary to desirable reasoning in other areas of biomedical ethics. In other
words, allowing Mary to die in order to save her viable twin is hardly a victory for
the pro-choice camp if she is then considered a "person" in the context of abortion,
with rights that can outweigh those of the mother.
II. Is Mary a Person?
This Essay attempts to understand the ontological status of Mary in a man-
ner that is most consistent with the conception of personhood adopted by courts in
the abortion debate, that is, by comparing Mary to a non-viable fetus. Ronald
Dworkin has advocated the exploration of this type of personhood for the purposes
of analyzing questions such as abortion rights because "the claim that a fetus is a
person means only that it has a right to be treated as a person, that is, in the way we
believe creatures that are undeniably persons, like you and me, should be treated
... without deciding whether or not they satisfy whatever standards of conscious-
ness we might think necessary for personhood in the philosophical sense." 30
Personhood is often defined in reference to autonomy, that is, the degree of
physical and psychological freedom a being has from other persons. Autonomous
personhood has two general uses in philosophy. One is to explore the contours of
the autonomous individual in the world, questioning what it means to be me as op-
posed to anyone else,31 or how I know that I am the same person over time.32 The
other is to define the meaning of the concept of person.33 The relevant questions are:
What degree of independence do I need from others in order to qualify as a person?
What is the quality or nature of that independence that makes me a person? I ad-
dress the first problem of personal identity briefly in my discussion of potentiality,
and begin instead with the concept of personhood.
Jeff McMahan has recently argued that these two questions are linked and
that the difference between the two inquiries is "superficial" because "[a] claim
29 There is a considerable philosophical literature that addresses these difficult issues in both general and
legal contexts. See generally 1 FRANCES M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY: DEATH AND WHOM TO SAVE
FROM IT (1993); PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996); PETER
SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1993); PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH (1994); Shiffrin,
supra note 24.
30 DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 23.
31 See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 199-345 (1984); THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM
NOWHERE 28-60 (1986).
32 MCMAHAN, supra note 27, at 7 ("The problem of personal identity over time may be approached in
either of two ways. We may ask what is necessarily involved in our continued existence. Or we may ask
what sort of thing we are essentially.").
33 See PARFIT, supra note 31, at 202.
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about what kind of thing we essentially are implies a set of conditions for our con-
tinued existence." 34 This may be true for the philosopher who is attempting to con-
struct a complete account of personhood and personal identity. However, I believe
that a "Gatekeeper" approach allows one to evaluate each question distinctly and
draw limited conclusions for each question without having to provide a complete
account of either personhood or personal identity. In other words, my proposed
conclusion that certain "physically dependant" beings are not persons might in-
form our idea of what it means to be the same person over time, but it by no means
dictates a complete or decisive answer to that inquiry.
There are a host of qualities that may make a being a "person." Cognition is
often thought to be one such quality. Descartes' formulation (the famous "cogito
ergo sum") has produced a lively and continuing debate about mind/body dual-
ism. 35 Other thinkers focus on the power or quality of cognitive abilities36 (this is
often used to separate humans from other thinking animals), or the quality of re-
taining the same memories and experiences over time.37 Other thinkers focus on
such factors as the ability to feel fear and suffering, and still others rely on religious
conceptions of beings with souls. 38 Ronald Dworkin has suggested the further ar-
gument that, even absent specific religious convictions, determinations of the "in-
trinsic moral significance" of a human life are a primarily spiritual matter.39 The
debates cannot be said to have been resolved, and have led to rather counterintui-
tive conclusions, such as Peter Singer's argument that some animals are "persons" 40
whereas some severely deformed or disabled human infants are not.41
The philosophical concept of personhood thus presents a puzzle. On the
one hand, it appears to be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a precise
definition of "person." As Bernard Williams has argued, "[tihe category of person,
though a lot has been made of it in some moral philosophy, is a poor foundation for
ethical thought, in particular because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion
while in fact it signals characteristics that almost all come in degrees."42 The "point"
34 MCMAHAN, supra note 27, at 7.
35 RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON THE FIRST PHILOSOPHY (2d ed., J. Cottingham ed. & trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1996) (1641).
36 For a summary and critique of such theories, see MCMAHAN, supra note 27, at 39-66.
37 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Peter H. Nidditch ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1975) (1689).
38 There are different religious views regarding the personhood status of the fetus. For example, since
1869 the Catholic Church has taken the position that a fetus is a person from the point of conception
onwards. See, e.g., Paul D. Simmons, Religious Approaches to Abortion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE
LAW 713 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992). Jewish law, on the other hand, main-
tains that a fetus is not a person until the point in birth when "the major part of the fetus has emerged."
DANIEL B. SINCLAIR, JEWISH BIOMEDICAL LAW: LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL DIMENSIONS 12 (2003). For a
general discussion and critique of the role of souls in conceptions of personhood, see MCMAHAN, supra
note 27, at 7-24.
39 DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 35.
40 PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, 110-17 (2d ed. 1993).
41 Id. at 117-19.
42 BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 114 (1985).
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at which a being becomes a person may look more like a process, 43 and the features
of personhood may look more like a spectrum, or a range of characteristics. 44
On the other hand, the concept of personhood seems to be an important, if
not indispensable, category for defining rights-bearing persons, an especially im-
portant concept in law. Our notions of rights and equality are rooted in the idea
that there is something common and universal about persons that demands a cer-
tain baseline of equal recognition and treatment under the law. As one judge has
remarked, we live in an era of rapidly advancing biomedical technology in which it
will become increasingly difficult for lawmakers and judges to avoid defining the
category of person.45 Thus, the project of examining personhood is inescapable, but
one's methodology should be tailored to best address the problems that philoso-
phers have identified. In other words, if it is true that a complete account of per-
sonhood and personal identity will return indeterminate results for the hardest
cases, it is sensible to reduce this indeterminacy as much as possible by focusing on
small properties that can answer discrete questions.
In this Part, I undertake what I will call the Gatekeeper approach to the
analysis of personhood. Instead of trying to construct an entire theory of what it
means to be a person, I will try to identify particular aspects or features of being
that we can definitively exclude from personhood in order to reach the conclusion
that neither Mary nor the non-viable fetus is a person. Using this technique it may
never be possible to come up with a precise or final definition of person. However,
there could be many uses in both philosophy and law for a simpler method of iden-
tifying certain beings that unmistakably are not persons.
My strategy thus has a few advantages. First, by limiting my analysis to the
argument that a non-viable fetus is not a person, I do not exclude the possibility
that viable fetuses also are not persons. Thus the argument does not limit the line of
permissibility for abortion only to viability, and other criteria may be available to
determine the (non)personhood status of the viable fetus. A second and related ad-
vantage is that this method of reasoning will allow us to limit our analysis to Mary
and the non-viable fetus, excluding from the analysis other controversial beings
such as humans who are brain dead or in persistent vegetative states (PVS), or
higher vertebrate animals. I seek through this analysis to conclude that the non-
viable fetus is not a person, thus providing the strongest underpinning to current
abortion law46 while leaving the personhood status of these other beings open for
43 see PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH 95 (1994) ("To ask in which hour of this process a hu-
man life begins may seem as pointless an exercise as the proverbial scholastic debates about how many
angels could fit on the head of a pin.").
44 Derek Parfit has used this sort of analysis in investigating the question of what it means to be the same
person over time. PARFrr, supra note 31, at 219-45.
4
s Jeffery L. Amestoy, Uncommon Humanity: Reflections on Judging in the Post-Human Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1581, 1583 (2003) ("The challenge for future generations will be to define what is most essentially hu-
man.").
46 See infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
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debate. This method of analysis helps counter the rejoinder that we cannot ever
know exactly when something is or becomes a person. I explore two features of
personhood: the qualities of dependence and rights.
A. Attachment to and Dependence on Another Human Being
I propose to analyze the relationship of autonomy to the concept of per-
sonhood by examining the manner in and degree to which persons actually func-
tion as autonomous, or separate from other persons. That is, how does dependence
on others define personhood? I will discuss three meanings of dependence, which I
will label "general dependence," "material dependence," and "physical depend-
ence." It becomes clear that beings that exhibit a very specific sort of dependence
are not persons, while beings that are otherwise dependent may (but do not neces-
sarily) qualify as persons.
1. General Dependence
Nearly all living beings, and indeed, all persons are, to a certain degree,
dependent upon others. It is, in my opinion, one of the better insights of modern
Continental and feminist philosophy to identify and explain the ways in which per-
sonal identity is formed by mutual dependence, and to explore the importance of
interpersonal dependence to moral and political philosophy,47 and to break down
the myth of the truly "autonomous" person.48 1 have chosen "dependence" as a
relevant hallmark of what makes a being an individual person. One could explore
similar ideas by examining the concept of control and asking the question: "How
much control does the being exert over itself?" This analysis would result in catego-
ries similar to those yielded by the dependence analysis.49 Thus, mere dependence
upon others cannot be what distinguishes persons from non-persons. I am speaking
of a more specific sort of dependence: a true and complete material dependence on
others.
2. Material Dependence
A person is materially dependent on others if the significant detachment of
that individual from the care of others would bring about fatal consequences. For
example, babies are materially dependent on their mothers, and brain-dead pa-
tients are materially dependent on machines and doctors. It is unquestioned that,
without outside care, the infant and the brain-dead patient would die. However,
47 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998); CHARLES
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENrITY (1989). See also STEPHEN MULHALL &
ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 41-47 (1992) (describing Sandel's criticism of Rawls's
view of the human being as one of "asocial individualism" that assigns "absolute moral priority to the
subject over its ends").
48 See generally, DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS (1993).
49 Foucault provides an interesting examination of how persons are always somewhat "controlled" by
others in his discussion of "docile bodies." See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 136-39 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995).
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notice that the source of care is unimportant because the caregivers in these situa-
tions are interchangeable. Notice that the particular identity of the caregiver is un-
important. Although caregivers often need specific qualifications, such as a doctor
who is caring for a brain-dead patient, the identity of the caregiver is otherwise ir-
relevant. Even in cases where being a caregiver requires highly-specialized qualifi-
cations, it is unlikely that these qualifications would be so specific and unique that
they would point to only one person over time and space. The caregiver may need
specific qualifications, such as a doctor's medical training, but even here the unique
identity of the caregiver is not what matters, only her qualifications. These qualifi-
cations are of undeniable importance- beings in especially precarious medical
conditions will require caregivers with highly specialized knowledge and training.
However, it is unlikely that these qualifications are so specific and unique that they
would point only to one unique person over time and space.50
The classification of "materially dependent" is not sufficient for a being to
be a person, because the category is over-inclusive. It includes, for example, many
animals that most of us are unwilling to consider persons. In fact, many adult ani-
mals are less of a dependant than an infant, or a person in a PVS. Thus, all we know
about material dependence is that it describes a wide variety of beings and does not
disqualify a being from the status of personhood. It will take other qualities to af-
firmatively describe a person.51 What the next section demonstrates is that Mary
falls into a category of dependence that delineates a class of beings that are clearly
not persons.
3. Physical Dependence
Some beings that are alive owe their continued existence to complete de-
pendence upon a physical attachment to a unique other. The paradigmatic example
is the non-viable fetus: this being could not continue to exist but for physical suste-
nance from the specific woman to which it is attached. It is thus difficult to charac-
terize this being as an autonomous person, not because of the dependence itself, as
we have already decided that persons can be dependent, or even materially depend-
ent upon others. Rather, these beings are not persons because it is difficult to un-
derstand them as separate from others. That is, they are not autonomous because
they are both dependant on another and a part of another. The fetus' dependence on
its mother does not destroy its personhood, as we have already seen that persons
can be dependent, and even materially dependent on others. The fetus lacks per-
sonhood because, in addition to being dependent on another, it is part of another. It
501 am setting aside the question here of whether there can even be unique persons over time and space.
Cf. PARFIT, supra note 31. Suffice it to say that we can accept as true that personal identity remains con-
stant for one person over a lifetime.
51 P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHYSICS 104 (1959) ("[The concept of a
person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of
consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics ... are equally applicable to an individ-
ual entity of that type.").
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is important, however, not to confuse being "part" of something as the mere state
of being connected to it.
However, being "part" of another does not necessarily imply physical de-
pendence on another or eliminate the possibility that each part is a person. For ex-
ample, it is perfectly natural to think of conjoined twins in which a successful sepa-
ration operation is possible, but has not yet been performed, as separate persons
who are not physically dependent on each other.
Conversely, being a physically independent "part" of another does not
guarantee that something is a person. It would be silly to think of a part of my body
such as my heart as a "person" simply because my heart can live viably in another
person. The attribute of physical dependence is doing the work in the argument,
not the attribute of attachment to some other thing. Attachment is merely a conse-
quence of the peculiar nature of physical dependence.
How, then, shall we explain the status of a heart, kidney, or other organ
that is only materially dependent (i.e., it may be transplanted to another body and
continue to live)? This illustrates my methodology of "Gatekeeper" personhood by
which we seek to identify categories of things that are definitively not persons,
rather than seeking a positive definition of personhood. In the case of a transplant-
able organ, then, dependence is not what will inform us that it is not a person.
Rather, we would look to some other category of non-personhood. For example,
organs have no brain function, and we would likely conclude that this is a feature
of non-personhood (as distinguished from a being with a non-functioning or ques-
tionably functioning brain which would present a harder case).
How might we distinguish Mary and the non-viable fetus from other be-
ings that are clearly persons? Both Mary and the non-viable fetus share a quality of
physical dependence because life for either of them is impossible without the con-
stant and continued dependence on the specific other. A further comparison is in-
structive. In 1971, Judith Jarvis Thomson offered an intriguing analogy to abortion.
She asked readers to imagine:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with a
... famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney
ailment, and ... you alone have the right blood type to help .... [T]he vio-
linist's circulatory system was plugged into yours .... To unplug you
would be to kill him. [You are required to support him because] all per-
sons have a right to life and violinists are persons. Granted, you have a
right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to
life outweighs [this right]. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. 52
-2 Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 47,48-49 (1971).
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Thomson suggests that the ordinary person would find this "outrageous"
and thus realize the implausibility of arguments that fetuses have an absolute right
to life.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to notice how influential Thom-
son's thought experiment has been.53 I would argue that this is because the rela-
tionship of the embryo or fetus to the woman is one that is so unique that it took a
science fiction-like example in order to explore the nature and extent of the rela-
tionship.
In making this argument, Thomson sought to explain why abortion is mor-
ally permissible, even if one were to assume that the fetus really is a person.5 4 This
is meant to answer two problems in the abortion debate: first, it would allow dis-
course on the subject without reference to the more religious ideas of life, and sec-
ond, it answers people's intuitive reaction that later-term fetuses really are per-
sons. 5 What follows in her article is an explication of how persons do not owe
those specific sorts of duties of rescue to other beings, even other living, rights-
bearing persons. In the discourse subsequent to the publication of her article,
Thomson's rights balancing analysis has been questioned and criticized on a num-
ber of grounds, for example, that the right of bodily autonomy cannot be equated
with or trump the right to life of another,5 6 or criticisms of her understanding of the
acting/allowing distinction with regards to killing and letting die.5 7 For present
purposes, however, it is the striking image of the unconscious violinist that illus-
trates the concept of physical dependence because it confirms the intuition that per-
sons are independent, and to live independently from others has a very specific
meaning in this sense. Here, however, I move beyond her story as mere metaphor
or analogy to show the analytical value of the picture she draws.5 8
1. Distinguishing Attachment and Physical Dependence
Properly understood, physical dependence can be used as a criterion for
excluding some beings from personhood. Suppose, for example, that the facts about
Mary and Jodie remain exactly the same except that they are born separated. The
doctors immediately conclude that though Mary has little organ function and is
centrally cyanosed, she can be sustained if they deliver oxygenated blood intrave-
nously. This situation would raise routine questions of the biomedical ethics sur-
rounding neonates.
53 A Westlaw search revealed that the article has been cited in 71 law review articles. This does not count
the number of other academic articles and books that cite this work.
54 Thomson, supra note 52, at 48.
55 Id.
56 Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1637,1675-76 (1998).
57 Id.
58 Cf. DANIEL DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM 12 (1984) (questioning the value of such thought experiments in
moral reasoning); Richard Epstein, Lifeboats, Desert Islands, and the Poverty of Modern Jurisprudence, 68
MIss. L.J. 861, 881 (1999) ("All too often, however, wholly imaginary examples are given too much
weight.").
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Suppose, however, that the doctors further determine that, due to some
rare condition, Mary can only be sustained by daily transfusions of Jodie's and only
Jodie's blood, or perhaps that Mary requires a kidney of which Jodie is the only
possible donor.59 Again, this raises significant biomedical ethics problems. Notice
here, however, that though Mary's life is contingent upon Jodie, she is not yet physi-
cally dependent.60
Finally, suppose that the doctors determine that the only way to sustain
Mary is by connecting her intravenously and permanently to Jodie and only to
Jodie. This is the case of In re A, save for the fact that the attachment occurs post
partum. Here, Mary is physically dependent. Notice that all three cases present dif-
ficult questions about how to understand Jodie's rights. In the first two cases, there
is at least a strong intuitive case to consider Mary's rights as well. Mary's status is
called into question most clearly in the third scenario. In this case, Mary is (or
would become) a part of Jodie. This violates the idea that persons are autonomous
beings that have boundaries that separate them from one another.61
When persons are somehow attached to other beings or to machines, the
specific attachment is only temporary, even if the need for attachment is permanent.
This is because even the materially dependent being can be transferred, as a sepa-
rate and bounded person, from one attachment to another. The physically depend-
ent being, however, cannot be transferred as a separate and bounded person and its
identity is thus not only linked to the other to which it is attached, but it seems to
have no identity of its own at all. It is not the physically dependent being's need for
permanent attachment that is significant; it is that the specific attachment itself is
permanent.
4. Physical Dependence and Intuitive Conclusions About Persons
I suspect that by this point some readers who are convinced by my argu-
ments that physically dependent beings are not persons are, nonetheless, still un-
easy with the conclusion that Mary is not a person. This uneasiness might come
from an intuition that a being that so resembles a human in form must be a person.
Scholars who argue that a fetus is a person, for example, have capitalized on these
intuitions by using ghastly images of aborted fetuses. These pictures are meant to
appeal to a sense that it is wrong to harm persons, and these beings look just like
59 See Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (1972) (in which parents of seven-year-old twins brought a declara-
tory judgment action, seeking a declaration that they had the right to consent to the transplant of a kid-
ney from one twin to the other).
60 An exploration of the relationship of contingency, as opposed to physical dependency, is beyond the
scope of this paper. It may be that contingent beings of this sort are not persons, although the case is not
as clear as that of physical dependency.
61 Postmodernists have addressed the concept of personal boundaries. See JACQUES DERRIDA, The Ends of
Man, in MARGINS OF PILOSOPHY 109 (Alan Bass ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1982).
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tiny persons.62 Though this image and intuition might cause some initial discom-
fort, it is important to test this idea against intuitions in other cases. This is particu-
larly important in light of the criticism that scholars defending the morality of abor-
tions have relied too heavily on images and thought experiments.63
In December of 2003, a woman gave birth to a daughter, Rebeca, with a rare
birth defect known as craniopagus parasiticus. 64 This is a birth defect in which the
mother gives birth to "[c]onjoined (grown-together) twins that are united at the
heads or crania... with one twin only partly developed and regarded as a parasite
on the other." 65 In this case, the second head had its own brain and partially formed
facial features. CNN reported that "[a]lthough only partially developed, the mouth
on her second head moves when Rebeca is being breast-fed. Tests indicate some
activity in her second brain."66 Assume for the moment that there is at least a plau-
sible argument that this second head was in fact a person.
The news reports of this event, as compared with the reports surrounding
In re A, reveal strong intuitions about the status of beings with fully formed human
features. From the outside, the conjoined twins of In re A might strike one as two
individuals connected at the chest: one sees two pairs of arms and legs, two heads
with two sets of facial features, and so on. Coverage of the birth reflected this view,
as newspapers around the globe reported the birth of conjoined twins.67 In contrast,
the reporters covering Rebeca's birth portrayed the event as the birth of one person,
not two. Multiple newspapers ran the story with headlines describing, in various
terms, a "two-headed baby."68
It is unclear, however, what difference, if any, there is between Rebeca's
"second head" and Jodie's "twin sister." Both were physically dependent on the
other twin and incapable of independent existence in any sense. Both had elements
of human features, differentiated only by the fact that Mary's were much more
62 See Dolgin, supra note 1, at 129 (discussing how anti-abortion activists have made particularly effective
use of the fetus and embryo as a symbol).
63 See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Foreword: Beyond the Model Rules: The Place of Examples in Legal Ethics, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 409, 425-26 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741, 773 (1993).
64 Dominican baby born with second head scheduled for rare surgery (Feb. 5 2004), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/02/04/dominican.two.heads.ap/index.html [hereinaf-
ter Dominican baby].
65 Craniopagus Parasiticus, in 2 ATrORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 6437 (1962).
66 Dominican baby, supra note 64.
67 See, e.g., Girl Dies as Joined Twins are Separated, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 2000, at 4; Surviving Siamese Twin
Battles for Her Life, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 8, 2000, at 10; Siamese Twin is Separated, 'Sadly Dies' to Save Her
Sister, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at A9; Separation of Conjoined Twins Proceeds Despite Protesters, THE IRISH
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2001, at 15.
68 See, e.g., Infant With Two Heads Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at A8; Surgeons Remove Baby's Second
Head, THE TORONTO STAR, Feb. 7, 2004, at A16; Battle to Save Two-Headed Baby, IRISH INDEPENDENT, Feb. 7,
2004, at 1; Doctors in 13 Hour Operation to Save Baby With Two Heads, THE TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 7, 2004, at
19; Louise Harrison, Tragedy of 2-Headed Baby: Little Rebeca Dies After 11 Hour Op, SUNDAY MIRROR, Feb. 8,
2004, at 36.
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fully developed. Finally, both had some sort of rudimentary sensory response. Doc-
tors reported that Mary exhibited some primitive response to painful stimuli,69 and
Rebeca's second head showed some evidence of brain activity and a moving
mouth.70 In fact, it appears that Rebeca's second head showed more brain activity
than Mary. Given those facts, on some accounts of personhood that rely on cogni-
tive function, the second head would be closer to the definition of a person than
Mary.
What, then, leads people to conclude that Mary and Jodie are two persons,
whereas Rebeca is one person with two heads? If it is only that Mary at first glance
resembles a person, then this is not enough to overcome the arguments I have made
above that physically dependent beings are not persons.
This analysis reaches farther than a clever thought experiment. Unlike the
unconscious violinist, Jodie and Rebeca were real children, born to real parents.
One can only imagine what a nightmare such events must have been for the par-
ents. Because these scenarios are and will continue to be real, clarity of thought and
argument when reacting to live human tissue in its various forms is imperative.
B. Claiming Rights
Thus far, I have argued that physical dependence, which includes the spe-
cial feature of attachment, can disqualify a living being from personhood status,
and that both Mary and the non-viable fetus are beings of this sort. In this section, I
discuss why this distinction matters in understanding rights.
Under our current legal framework, rights attach to persons.71 I do not here
undertake a full examination of the content of the rights of persons. My aim is sim-
ply to show that whatever these rights may be and however they might be bal-
anced against each other or trumped by other rights, 72 it is clear that the physically
dependent being is not a full rights-bearing agent.
2. Defining Rights
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that living beings can have
claims upon others that do not rise to the level of rights, or to the level of rights
69 See supra, notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
70 See Dominican baby, supra note 64.
71 1 am setting aside the prior question of whether other sorts of beings do or should have rights as a
philosophical matter as the purpose of this Essay is to examine the consequences of personhood for our
rights framework as it currently exists in the United States.
72 Most bioethical dilemmas involve this sort of analysis. For example, we must weigh the right of a par-
ent to practice her religion as she sees fit against the right of a child to receive medical treatment. See,
e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112 (1988) (upholding the prosecution of Christian Science
parents for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment).
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owed to persons. For example, one might believe that vertebrate animals have a
claim to humane treatment. They do not have a right to life against slaughter for
food or clothing products, nor do they have a right to liberty against use in scien-
tific experiments. Rather, they have claims to certain standards of treatment in
these settings based on their various capacities. 73 In other words, to determine that
a being is not a rights-bearing agent is not to say that it has no interests at all that
must be given some consideration when making ethical decisions. For example, a
living being with the capacity for suffering might have a particularly compelling
interest to be spared pain.74 One could argue that the interests I am discussing are
merely "rights" of other sorts of beings. For the sake of clarity, however, I will refer
to "rights" as those that only persons have and "interests" as those that living be-
ings in general might have.
3. Autonomy and Equality
As a technical matter, the rights that persons in a country like the United
States possess are granted and enforced by the state. The concept of natural rights
still can be helpful, however, in examining the types of rights that persons have in
the United States and how rights are related to personhood.
John Rawls has described natural rights as "the rights that justice protects.
... The existence of these attributes and the claims based upon them is established
independently from social conventions and legal norms." 75 These are contrasted
with "rights that are defined by law and custom."76 The rights at stake in biomedi-
cal ethics, particularly in issues such as abortion or cases like In re A, include claims
such as the right not to be harmed by others or the right to decide what to do with
one's body. These rights do seem to be those "that justice protects." That is, in addi-
tion to constitutionally protected rights, one would expect to see a system of crimi-
nal law that prohibits and punishes actions of unwarranted killing or bodily harm,
or tort law that establishes liability for those who violate bodily autonomy by per-
forming medical procedures without the consent of the patient.
73 I shall return to this point later to argue that, though Mary does not have a right to life, she has certain
claims that the court properly took into account in In re A. This is to show that the court had a way for
accounting for Mary's interest without according her personhood status.
74 For an especially strong defense of this claim, see SINGER, supra note 8, at 57-61 ("If a being suffers,
there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what
the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted equally with the
like suffering - in so far as rough comparisons can be made - of any other being."). However, even phi-
losophers who take avoidance of pain to be a relatively uncontroversial value still ascribe this as a human
interest. See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 31, at 166-67 (arguing that "each of us has reason to give significant
weight to the simple sensory pleasure or pain of others as well as to his own" but then observing that
this is a "human interest").
75 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 442 n.30 (revised ed. 1999). Although Rawls makes different argu-
ments about personhood and justice from those presented here, his basic definitions are useful clarifica-
tions of how the concepts of personhood and justice interact in philosophical debate.
76 Id.
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Contrast with these sorts of rights those that one might consider to be non-
natural, for example, the right to bring a lawsuit in a federal court instead of a state
court. In this Essay, I do not wish to take up the arguments for precisely which
rights are natural or non-natural, or whether, as a philosophical matter, there are
even natural rights at all. What is important to notice is that those rights that com-
mentators typically describe as "natural" are those claims against others that we
would expect people to have in virtue of their being persons, whereas the so-called
"non-natural" rights often strike us as instrumental or discretionary and not de-
rived from the fact that the rights-bearer is a person. As Rawls argues, rights-
bearing agents are persons because they are the "sorts of beings [who] are owed the
guarantees of justice."77 Philosophers have presented various theories of moral per-
sonhood. Two important aspects of personhood emerge from the literature that ties
rights to personhood: equality and autonomy.
Equality here refers to the aspects of personhood that are universal. That is,
it tries to extract what qualities of persons are "sufficient condition[s] for being enti-
tled to equal justice" 78 or why people ought to be "treated as equals." 79 Autonomy,
on the other hand, is the sense in which persons are individual and unique and
ought to be respected as such. Rawls's definition of moral personality is one illus-
tration of how these two qualities work together. He writes that "[m]oral persons
are distinguished by two features: first, they are capable of having (and are as-
sumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life);
and second they are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of jus-
tice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice, at
least to a certain minimum degree."80 Both features of Rawls's person are the basis
for what is universal about persons, and the first feature is the element of unique-
ness that represents autonomy. Rawls's definition of moral personality is not with-
out its problems,81 and I do not mean to endorse his specific view or a specific moral
personhood in this Essay.
A more general statement of the argument accommodates different under-
lying views: Rights-bearing agents are persons because they are "equals" by virtue
of possessing the universal qualities of A, B, and C and because they are autono-
mous by virtue of the capacity to function in X, Y, and Z manner in the world. My
argument is that in order to determine that the physically dependent being is not a
person with rights, we do not need to agree upon the exact nature of the variables
as they might apply to all agents. Rather, I will show how the physically dependent
77 Id. at 442.
78Id.
79 For an account of Dworkin's theory of treating people as equals, see generally RONALD M. DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000).
80 RAWLS, supra note 75, at 442.
81 Most notably, Rawls's view might exclude infants, the severely disabled, or persons in a PVS. See
SINGER, supra note 8, at 19.
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being fails to be either equal or autonomous and thus does not have the rights that
persons have.
The reasons why a physically dependent being is not autonomous largely
track the dependency analysis from the previous section. It is perfectly reasonable
to think of generally dependent and materially dependent beings as autonomous.
Though these beings require forms of assistance from others in order to act in the
world, this dependence does not mean that a person is not autonomous. As I ar-
gued above, the level of dependence is mostly a matter of degree. These persons
need others in order to interact in the world, but because the identities of these oth-
ers are many and are interchangeable, the person is still acting in the world
autonomously, that is, as its own person.8 2 However, a physically dependent being
can never act in the world as its own person or being because its existence is inex-
tricably part of and tied to that of the specific other.
It is also difficult to see how physically dependent beings could have
claims to be treated as equals. Equal treatment means that each person deserving of
such treatment has the capacity to be treated in a certain manner by other persons at
any given time. As a practical matter, rights will involve interactions between spe-
cific, identifiable individuals. It is true that they will involve contingencies upon the
actions of others and must be balanced against the claim of others. However, they
are still universal in character.
Suppose that the specific right we have identified is the right not to be
killed. Those persons that are materially dependent possess such a right, and this
right must be honored but can also be balanced against the rights and claims of
others. Thus, though the right is dependent on the existence of others generally, the
right does not hinge on the existence of a specific, identifiable, and unique other.
With the physically dependent being, the principle of equal treatment is violated
because the "right" of the physically dependent being can never be balanced or re-
spected generally by any other "equal" person without affecting the rights and in-
terests of the attached person.
In other words, a right is not a "right" at all if it is in fact a claim against a
specific and unique other. As Amartya Sen has explained, "[I]t is not unusual to
think of rights as a relation between two parties, i and j for example, person i hav-
ing the claim on j that he will do some particular thing for i. There is, however,
some advantage in characterizing goal rights as a relation not primarily between
two parties, but between one person and some 'capability' to which he has a right,
for example, the capability of person i to move about without harm."83 If we are
82 As argued earlier, there may be other qualities of autonomy that disqualify other beings for other rea-
sons, but this does not affect my present argument.
83 Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,16 (1982).
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incapable of respecting a person's rights in the general sense, then it is difficult to
identify the being with claims as a separate and distinct person.
Returning to the image of the unconscious violinist, I believe that the
Thomson thought experiment shows the following: A being that requires such a
unique attachment to another is not a person because we cannot conceptualize that
being in the same way that we would conceptualize all other persons. Mary is one
such being. Her claim is not a right to depend on others for existence. Rather, her
identity is defined by an inseparable claim on another. I thus claim that Mary is not
autonomous in the most basic sense because we cannot respect her rights generally.
This is also at the heart of claims about the personhood status of the fetus: We are
uncomfortable thinking of a being as a person when its existence is physically and
uniquely tied to an autonomous person. In other words, no matter how we formu-
late and reformulate the status of the fetus, the burdens of dependence cannot be
generalized in the way that any other right or responsibility can.
III. Consequences for the Current State of Abortion Doctrine in the United
States
A. The Viability Standard
The principle of independent viability is closely related to the concepts of
dependence discussed in Part II.A. The legal standard of viability is close, but not
completely aligned with the very specific concepts of dependence that I have of-
fered and thus deserves separate treatment 4 This section directly addresses the
legal importance of viability.
In the United States, the state is theoretically supposed to refrain from mak-
ing decisions about when human "life" begins.85 Despite this assertion, the Court
has announced a standard for when the state develops an interest compelling
enough to justify prohibiting abortion. This suggests that there is a point at which
the fetus has developed into something which is worthy of state protection that can
outweigh the interests of the mother. The point in a pregnancy at which a fetus is
viable outside of the womb is the point at which a state "may, if it chooses ... pro-
scribe abortion."86
I contend that the Court associated this point with some notion of person-
hood. In other words, viability is the time at which the fetus acquires rights "be-
84 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, I would note that the viability standard might benefit
from the sort of dependency analysis in which I engage.
85 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) ("a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify
its regulation of abortions."); But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 452 U.S. 450 (1989) (find-
ing that a statement in a statute's preamble that "the life of each human being begins at conception"
does not violate this standard).
86 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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cause the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb." 87 Technically, the fetus, as such, does not ever have "rights" be-
cause the Court held that it is not a "person" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment.88 The question is always whether the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the fetus' life. I will, however, for the sake of brevity, refer to the "rights
of the fetus," but this is only shorthand for the state's interest in the life of the fetus.
Whatever "meaningful life" is, it is clearly one way of distinguishing any
given life (an acorn, a fish, a monkey, a non-viable fetus) from a life that the state is
justified in protecting over other fundamental interests and rights of persons.
The Court has identified other aspects of pregnancy as important factors
for deciding the rights of the fetus. Justice Blackmun offered a structure of rights
based on the trimesters of pregnancy.8 9 The Court has since rejected this formula-
tion, holding that the state has certain compelling interests in regulating abortion
from the time of conception, so long as these regulations do not place an "undue
burden" on a woman's right to choose abortion,90 recognizing that "the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of pregnancy in ... the life of the fetus."91 How-
ever, this newer standard left the viability standard intact, as the Court reaffirmed
that the right of a woman "to choose to have an abortion before viability."92
Casey and other cases emphasize that states may enact statutes and pro-
mote practices that favor childbirth over abortion. Therefore, a judicial recognition
that a being akin to a non-viable fetus has recognizable and meaningful interests
may set a precedent for applying that same analysis to the fetus itself. Given the
Court's willingness to push back the state's more general interest to the point of
conception in Casey, these sorts of decisions outside of the abortion context may
have a significant impact on how the Court chooses to address the scope of a
woman s right to choose an abortion.93 In re A is one such case. Though the court
explicitly acknowledged that Mary was not viable "outside" of her connection to
Jodie, the court considered her a full person nonetheless. 94
A decision like In re A in the United States would threaten to make viability
itself an unusable standard for determining when the fetus acquires a right to life,
giving the Court reasons based in fact to overturn Roe. This is because, though the
joint opinion in Casey refused to overturn the basic holding of Roe, it suggested that
87 Id. at 163.
I8 d. at 158.
89 Id. at 164-65.
90 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992).
91 Id. at 846.
92 Id.
93 One may be inclined to argue that a woman should have the right to choose an abortion past the point
of viability. This is beyond the scope of this paper, as I wish only to address how pro-choice activists can
best argue within the current legal framework.
94 See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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principles of stare decisis might support overturning Roe if the Court were pre-
sented with new facts, or new understandings of facts. 95 In other words, the Court
could justify overturning Roe by claiming that new "facts," such as personhood
analysis from In re A demonstrate that even the earliest fetus is a person.
Although I have argued that Mary is very analogous to a fetus, one might
still argue that there is a meaningful difference that would allow us to treat Mary as
a person. One possible way of distinguishing a fetus that a woman may legally
abort from Mary is that the fetus is still inside the womb, whereas Mary is not.
However, this distinction is, at best, superficial. It is clear that Mary could not sur-
vive independently in the world, either in the philosophical sense of physical de-
pendence or in the legal sense of viability. Thus, the literal physical location of the
being seems somewhat beside the point. It is the consequences of being inside the
womb that matters, and the consequences here are identical. Thus, a mere existence
outside of the womb should not qualify as sufficient to confer rights or personhood
status upon a being.96
B. Potentiality
The above arguments concerning dependence and viability strongly sug-
gest criteria by which one can make a legal or moral determination about the per-
sonhood status of a fetus, or of Mary. There is, however, an alternative ground for
understanding the fetus as a rights-bearing "person." This is the theory that the
fetus is a potential life. Even if one does not believe that an embryo or fetus is a hu-
man life, one may believe that the potential for human life has a moral status of its
own, and that status confers rights upon it that must be balanced (or, more se-
verely, must always trump) the rights and interests of the mother.
Potentiality is a particularly poor value to invoke in the abortion debate. A
thorough critique is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is useful to state a sample
objection. For example, it is unclear to me how the Supreme Court understands the
value of potential life, since that value apparently changes and increases over the
course of the pregnancy.97 This is so despite the fact that the viable fetus has no
more potential for life than the weeks-old embryo-it is simply closer to being
born.98 It has been suggested that if the arguments about potentiality were followed
to their logical conclusion, then the state would be justified not only in prohibiting
95 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-61.
96 The fact of being born might hold some moral significance, but it is unclear to me that this is related to
personhood. For example, in her discussion of the concept of natality, Hannah Arendt explores its impli-
cations for personal identity, but not necessarily for the concept of personhood itself. See HANNAH
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDMON 9 (1959).
97 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 (acknowledging that the value of potential life increases over the course of
the pregnancy).
98 It may be true that the older the fetus is, the more statistically likely it is to be born. This argument is
not convincing, however, as it confuses potentiality with statistical probability. Statistics do not predict
individual events. It is thus impossible to say that the embryo has less "potential" than a third trimester
fetus.
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abortion at all stages of pregnancy, even in cases of rape, but also in prohibiting the
use of birth control.99 I am further puzzled how we can ascribe any rights or inter-
ests to a being that is only potential and is not yet extant. Despite these rather obvi-
ous objections to the potentiality argument, it remains central to the abortion de-
bate, and the Supreme Court considers potential for human life an important inter-
est that a state may protect.10 0
The case of Mary has an interesting effect on abortion discourse: it shows
that courts and scholars ought to be careful, not only in concluding that Mary is not
a person, but also in describing the reasons for refusing to ascribe rights and per-
sonhood status to Mary. An intuitive argument concerning Mary would be to claim
that she has no rights and is not a person because she has no potential for contin-
ued life or existence apart from Jodie.
One basis of a moral argument for prohibiting abortions is the concept of
potentiality. This concept has been used in other areas of biomedical ethics as well.
For example, the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs uses the concept of potentiality in formulating their position regarding the
status of anencephalic infants.
Anencephalic infants are those born with only a brain stem, "they have
never experienced consciousness and will never experience consciousness."10 1 The
British court found Mary to be in essentially the same condition. 02 The AMA noted
that "parents of anencephalic neonates always have the option of discontinuing
life-sustaining treatment," and concluded that because the anencephalic neonate
had no past interests and no future potential to exist as persons in any meaningful
sense that "respect for the essential worth of the anencephalic neonate does not
necessarily entail the preservation of its life," and that "anencephalic neonates can-
not have interests of any kind." 03 In other words, a lack of potentiality is a valid
ground for refusing to recognize a being as a person in the ordinary sense.
It is not difficult to see the next step in the argument: If it is morally per-
missible to refuse to recognize rights in a being with absolutely no potential for
human life, then potentiality is a valid variable for determining personhood. There-
fore, pro-life activists can argue that the potentiality of the fetus or embryo is an
appropriate consideration in the rights balance considered in the abortion debate.
Note that this does not demand the logical conclusion that potentiality is key to
understanding the status of the fetus. That is, the AMA argues that (1) being A has
no potential for human life, so therefore (2) being A is not a person for purposes of
rights analysis.
99 See DWORKIN, supra note 27, at 110-11; SINGER, supra note 8, at 83-100.
100 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155-56 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-61.
101 AMA Council, The Use of Anencephalic Neonates as Organ Donors, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1614 (1995).
102 See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
103 AMA Council, supra note 101.
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Thus, the only permissible logical conclusion from this argument is that "if
a being is a person it has (as one feature) the potential for human life." It does not
tell us the direct significance of potentiality. However, this distinction is quite tech-
nical. The argument I make in the text is still quite intuitive, and could thus have
adverse effects on judicial reasoning regarding abortion rights.
Therefore, when analyzing In re A, it is better to focus on the present physi-
cal characteristics of Mary rather than make moral arguments concerning her lack
of potentiality. Courts have made these considerations when confronted with diffi-
cult situations concerning anencephalic infants. For example, a Florida court re-
fused to characterize an anencephalic neonate as "dead," 104 and the Fourth Circuit
held that a federal statute required a hospital to treat an anencephalic infant.105
These cases support the proposition that potentiality should not be dispositive in
making rights and personhood determinations. Furthermore, the protections af-
forded to these neonates do not dictate a similar conclusion for Mary -they are dis-
tinguished on the grounds of dependence argued above. That is, Mary falls into the
category of physical dependence along with the non-viable fetus, whereas the an-
encepahlic neonate is merely materially dependent.106
Conclusion
I have argued that the British court in In re A reached the correct result in
enjoining the parents of Jodie from refusing to consent to the operation to sever the
twins. However, I have also argued that the court reached this result by a process of
reasoning that may have unexpected results for moral reasoning in the abortion
debate.
I have also suggested that this result was not necessary, that the court
could have attained its result in a manner consistent with abortion jurisprudence
and norms, and in a manner that accounts for the interests at stake. The court ought
to have reached the conclusion that Jodie is a person with the full rights-bearing
agency that any infant would normally have. Mary, on the other hand, should not
have been considered a person. This does not mean, however, that the court would
have been forced to disregard Mary's interests altogether. The court could have
dealt with Mary in a manner consistent with the law's treatment of sentient verte-
brate animals. Indeed, the court made a detailed inquiry into exactly these interests:
what sort of feeling Mary might have had and the fact that continued life offered
her little but continued suffering. Although beyond the scope of this Essay, I would
first argue that the parents have a conflict of interest making them poorly situated,
104 In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 594 (Fla. 1992).
105 In re Baby K., 16 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1994).
106 This should not be considered an endorsement of the results in the anencephalic baby cases; rather, it
is only a means of distinguishing the results from In re A in order to maintain that potentiality is an in-
appropriate consideration in that case.
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both legally and morally, to exert sole control over medical intervention for Jodie. I
would then suggest that only Jodie be appointed a guardian ad litem, but with the
understanding that the guardian could balance the rights of Jodie against the inter-
ests of Mary as Jodie might do if she were competent to make her own decisions
regarding medical treatment. Furthermore, appointing a guardian to Jodie (or, al-
ternatively, deciding what is in Jodie's best interests) could include an analysis of
the moral or religious views that Jodie might have. Though this possibility is com-
plicated and somewhat problematic, it does signal, at the very least, the existence of
a mechanism by which the decision maker may account for the religious beliefs of
Jodie's parents. Finally, appointing a guardian ad litem preserves the value at the
heart of the pro-choice position: when faced with a difficult decision regarding a
physically dependent being, the person ought to be able to choose for herself the
course of action to follow.
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